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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the historical record of the financial crises that have often accompanied
surges of globalization in the past. The issue of contagion, the spread of financial turbulence from the
crisis center to its trading partners, is confronted with historical and statistical evidence on the causes and
consequences of well-known crises. In general, contagion seems often confused with prior
interdependence, and crises are less widespread and shorter in duration than anecdotal evidence would
indicate. Special attention is given to the gold standard period of 1880-1913, which we find useful to
divide into the initial period of deflation, 1880-1896, and the following period of mild inflation, 1897-
1913. We find evidence of changes in the pattern of "contagion" from core to periphery countries between
the two periods, but in both periods apparent contagions can more readily be interpreted as responses to
common shocks. Lessons for the present period can only be tentative, but the similarities in learning
experiences are striking.
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As the global financial system has evolved since 1971, financial historians have 
become increasingly struck by similarities in the stresses and setbacks that have 
occurred in international financial markets with those that plagued earlier attempts at 
creating a global financial system.  The decade of the 1990s was beset by exchange rate 
crises in Asia and meltdowns of emerging markets in the former centrally planned 
economies.  Likewise, the decade of the 1890s a century earlier saw a series of financial 
crises that threatened to become systemic at times.  Just as the booming US capital 
markets in the late 1990s seemed to help stabilize the international financial system at 
the time, so did the flurry of new activity in the London Stock Exchange promote a rise 
of international liquidity in the late 1890s.  Just as leading commentators on the state of 
financial markets at the end of the twentieth century argued that the provision of 
liquidity to financial markets by the actions of the US Federal Reserve System only 
made the dangers of financial fragility more serious when the markets inevitably 
collapsed, so did serious analysts in the 1890s criticize the actions of the Bank of 
England, especially R. H. Palgrave.
1   
The similarity between the financial pressures and varied responses of 
participating countries to the emergence of global capital markets in the 1890s and 
1990s has not gone unnoticed by economic historians.  Bordo and Eichengreen (1999) 
look systematically at the characteristics of crises particularly in the gold standard 
period to determine the extent to which inferences may be drawn about the role of 
capital mobility, fixed exchange rates, and financial regulation in those earlier crises.  
Bordo and Schwartz (1999) have made a useful catalog of crises, distinguishing between banking crises that interrupt the internal payments system and currency crises 
that disrupt the external payments relations.  Charles Kindleberger (2000)
2 has provided 
a checklist of financial crises going back to the tulipmania of 1636 in Holland and up to 
the Asian crisis of 1997 and the subsequent Russian and Brazilian crises in 1998. 
The interpretations placed on these historical experiences of international 
financial crises by the respective authors reflect, ultimately, their judgments whether 
today’s global financial market needs an international lender of last resort 
(Kindleberger) or a time-consistent set of monetary rules among the participating 
countries (Bordo).  If contagion, the spread of a financial crisis from the country of 
origin to innocent trading partners or geographical neighbors whose financial 
fundamentals are sound, is a frequent consequence of a financial crisis, then surely a 
lender of last resort is a good idea.  Injection of liquidity at the appropriate time in the 
center of the crisis could forestall scrambles for liquidity from trading partners or allies.  
If, on the other hand, crises spread mainly because trading partners have either weak 
currencies or fragile banking systems, then credible commitments to a sound currency 
and conservative banking practices need to be acquired by countries participating in a 
global financial system.  Lurking behind each viewpoint is a historical judgment call: 
either, the consequences of financial crises are so dire they should be averted when at 
all possible; or, they provide useful learning experiences that can lead to ever sounder 
financial and monetary systems.  Relying on a lender of last resort to bail out one’s 
unwise or risky loans, by contrast, removes the incentives for developing either sound 
financial institutions or monetary arrangements.   
                                                                                                                                                                         
1 Palgrave, p. vii. The classic account of financial contagions, Charles Kindleberger’s Manias, 
Panics, and Crashes, presents a standard pattern in which speculative fevers are caused 
by the appearance of new, unusually profitable, investment opportunities.  Often, the 
new opportunities accompany movements toward globalization as new markets or 
technologies appear that can be exploited by a given country or by an economic sector 
in several countries.  Prices of the new assets that are created in response to the new 
opportunity are driven to unsustainable heights, panic eventually occurs and investors 
then scramble to withdraw their funds, not only from the original market but also from 
any other market that resembles it.  The renewed possibilities of contagion in the global 
capital markets of the 21
st century have created concerns for national policymakers and 
for international organizations charged with maintaining order in the international 
market places.
3   
Countering these concerns with contagion in financial markets, academic 
economists have distinguished between “contagion” and “interdependence.”   
Propagation of a financial shock from the “origin” economy to one or more “host” 
economies may occur through the channels of short-term credit flows if the economies 
are interdependent by virtue of substantial trade with each other and substantial 
investments in each other. (Frankel and Rose, 1998).  Contagion, however, should not 
be restricted to economies that are relatively insular, as even normally interdependent 
economies with substantial flows of trade and factor movements with each other, may 
be subject to contagion – if propagation of the financial shock is more rapid and 
                                                                                                                                                                         
2 Reflecting the renewed interest in financial crises and contagion, this work came out 
in its fourth edition in November 2000.   
3 For example, Tamuir Baig and Ilan Goldfajn, “Financial Market Contagion in the 
Asian Crisis,” IMF Staff Papers, vol. 46 (June 1999), pp. 167-195. widespread than reactions to normal fluctuations in trade and capital movements.   
Noting that recent financial crises in the late 1990s created increased turbulence in 
related markets, they ask whether the increase in correlation among, say, bond prices or 
stock market indices that accompanied the Asian financial crisis starting in July 1997, 
was due simply to the statistical effect that an increase in variance of two variables will 
raise their measured correlation.  If, after adjusting for the effect on correlation of 
increased variance, there is no increase in correlation among the financial markets after 
a crisis, the case for contagion disappears.
4  All that remains, then, is the normal 
responses to each other’s difficulties that will arise among interdependent economies.  
So also, presumably, the case for a lender of last resort would disappear.  The force of 
this argument depends whether one thinks that prior interdependence was a good thing, 
enlarging the country’s production possibilities, rather than a bad thing, simply setting 
it up for a fallout from a crisis in any of its trading partners.  If a good thing originally, 
then common lessons learned should be beneficial as well and not averted.  Another 
possibility is that interconnected countries are struck by a system-wide shock that has 
similar effects on each country, for example, the oil shocks of the 1970s on the oil 
importing countries.  Whether a lender of last resort would have coped better with the 
OPEC cartel than the learning experience that actually occurred depends on one’s 
appraisal of the consequences of the crisis and then of the lessons learned.   
Below, we consider Kindleberger’s historical examples of international crises 
and contagion in chronological sequence, asking in each case 1) what is the evidence 
for contagion, judged by the standards set by analysts of the crises of the 1990s, and 2) 
                                                            
4 Kristin Forbes and Roberto Rigobon, “No Contagion, Only Interdependence: 
Measuring Stock Market Co-Movements,” NBER Working Paper 7267, July 1999,  what were the consequences of the crisis for the evolution of financial and monetary 
systems?  The crises considered are the tulip mania of 1637, the Mississippi and South 
Sea Bubbles of 1719-20, the Latin American debt crisis of 1825, the international crisis 
of 1873, the Baring crisis of 1890, the stock market crises of 1893, the panic of 1907, 
the Wall Street crashes of 1929 and 1987, and the Asian crises of 1997.  Kindleberger 
picks on the crises of 1720, 1873, 1890, and 1929 as cases of international financial 
crises whose consequences were especially severe and there was no lender of last 
resort.  (Kindleberger, 2000, p. 207)
5  We deal with other, minor episodes in passing, 
but pay special attention to the crises of 1873, 1890, 1893, and 1907 using new, high-
frequency data from a wide range of financial markets in those years of the classic gold 
standard.  These also happen to be the same international financial crises identified as 
yielding analogies to today’s financial crises by Charles Goodhart and P. Delargy 
(1998).  As we shall see, the evidence for contagion is mixed, as is the evidence for 
learning.  Historical circumstances count for a great deal, today as in the past, but we 
insist that learning has occurred and can continue to occur.  Implementation of the 
institutional reforms required to avert financial crises in the future, however, depends 
upon the political will and sense of common peril among policy makers. 
II. The Tulip Mania of 1636-37 
The first financial crisis of note after the European “discoveries” of the trading 
and exploitation possibilities in the rest of the world – especially the West Indies, the 
                                                                                                                                                                         
NBER: Cambridge, MA. 
5 Kindleberger also points to the domestic crises of 1882 in France and 1921 in Britain 
where no lender of last resort acted, but these were limited to the country of origin. East Indies, and Africa – was the tulip mania in Holland, 1637.
6  Despite the attention 
paid to this episode by the chroniclers of human folly, Peter Garber’s analysis of this 
dramatic episode reduces it to a month’s worth of idle speculation by burgers confined 
to bars in the city of Haarlem at the height of the Thirty Years War during an outbreak 
of the plague.  These individuals, short of capital and long on leisure, knowingly made 
unenforceable bargains on common tulips for delivery in six months.  In fact, their 
bargains were not enforced, save at 3.5 to 10% of the original amount, for those traders 
wishing to continue in the tulip business afterwards.  Such capital as was bound up in 
these futures contracts, however, was seen by the authorities as a diversion from more 
useful investments in government bonds to continue financing the Dutch war effort.  
The government’s hostility to such private uses of funds during wartime accounts for 
the negative press that the tulip mania received at the time, which was has been 
continued by generations of historians ever since. 
In Garber’s economic analysis, however, the prices usually quoted as examples 
of speculative excess were, indeed, normal for first generation bulbs of unusual beauty 
that could be used to reproduce generations of subsequent blooms, which naturally fell 
sharply in price as production grew.  Later markets for bulbs in normal times, whether 
for tulips or hyacinths, show similar high prices for the originals and rapid declines 
afterwards.  Further, there seems to have been no contagion to other financial centers 
from the tulip speculation as such, although the financial demands of the Thirty Years 
War upon the commercial cities and towns of the European continent created 
disruptions as well.   
                                                            
6 Peter M. Garber, Famous First Bubbles: The Fundamentals of Early Manias, 
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000.   While Kindleberger leads off his chapter on “Domestic Contagion” with a 
critique of Garber’s analysis,
7 the evidence he cites from other secondary works 
emphasizes the general prosperity of the Dutch republic after the mania had passed and 
prices had collapsed.  The inference he draws implicitly is that building canals and 
luxury residences were also silly speculations by the Dutch.  Most historians, and 
contemporaries, however, attribute the prosperity of the Dutch in this “golden age” to 
the profits they extracted as an entrepôt for Protestant forces in northern Europe during 
the Thirty Years War, 1618-48.  Especially beneficial was their monopoly of the Baltic 
trade as they circumvented the Spanish blockade to the Mediterranean and even 
established trading colonies in the West Indies.
8  The closest thing to contagion was 
speculation in other commodity derivatives in the summer of 1636 in other Dutch 
towns, but these, like the tulip mania in Haarlem, are attributed to the outbreaks of 
plague and the quarantines imposed by municipal authorities on traveling merchants.
9 
The main outcome of the financial crises attending the Thirty Years’ War, 
however, was to promote lasting financial innovations, creating perpetual or life 
annuities that could be easily transferred to third parties.  These were issued by 
individual cities in northern Europe that were forced to pay “Kontributionen” to 
warlords maintaining armies in their vicinity.
10  When the armies moved on, leaving the 
structures of the town intact if the payment had sufficed, the town’s debts remained but 
                                                            
7 Charles P. Kindleberger, Manias, Panics, and Crashes,  4
th ed., New York: John 
Wiley & Sons, 2000, pp. 109-110. 
8 Jonathan Israel, The Dutch Republic:Its Rise, Greatness and Fall, 1477-1806, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995. 
9 Jan de Vries and Ad van der Woude, The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure 
and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500-1815, Cambridge: at the University 
Press, 1997, pp. 150-151. were serviced indefinitely from the local tax base.  Eventually, these were marketed to 
citizens in adjacent towns and cities as well, laying the basis for the “financial 
revolution” in public finance of the later 17
th century.
11  The lessons learned by the 
Dutch were evident in their emphasis on promoting overseas trade by maintaining a 
joint stock company for the Asian trade (the Dutch East India Company), unifying the 
mint standards of the provinces, facilitating merchant payments through a public 
exchange bank in Amsterdam, and assigning specific excise taxes for the service of 
government debts issued mainly by the individual cities and provinces.
12 (Neal, 2000)  
The golden age of the Dutch Republic ensued, the “contagion” of the tulip mania safely 
contained. 
III. The Mississippi and South Bubbles of 1719-20 
Nearly a century after the tulip mania in Holland, the French and British 
governments created the Mississippi and South Sea bubbles, stock market schemes 
designed to reduce the burden of debt service, given weak governments that lacked the 
authority to raise taxes.  Both governments sought to swap the bulk of their outstanding 
debt for equity in large joint-stock trading companies with monopoly privileges – the 
Mississippi Company (Compagnie des Indes) in France and the South Sea Company in 
Britain.  Both efforts had the full support of the government currently in power, and 
both were successful ultimately in reducing the respective debt burdens, at the expense 
of debt holders who delayed converting their debt holdings or who failed to sell out 
                                                                                                                                                                         
10 Fritz Redlich, "Contributions in the Thirty Years' War," Economic History Review, 
12 (December 1959), 247-54. 
11 James Tracy, A financial revolution in the Habsburg Netherlands, Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1985. their equity holdings before the crash.  The two schemes were connected through 
international capital movements, as investors from both the Netherlands and Britain 
were first attracted to John Law’s investment opportunities in France from July to 
December 1719, and then to the rising stock markets in London from March to 
September 1720.  By October 1720, however, both schemes had collapsed, thanks 
mainly to the total disruption of the European payments system in the summer of 1720.  
This was caused mostly by John Law’s efforts to rescue his system from the dangers of 
capital flight (by letting the French currency depreciate rapidly, he hoped to induce 
speculative inflows in anticipation of the revaluation that would follow), but 
complicated by the last outbreak of the plague on the European continent and the 
quarantines imposed by municipal authorities.   
Much has been made of the supposed contagion of irrational speculation that 
swept across northern Europe in these two years,
13 but recent work by economists has 
reduced both to essentially rational, if premature, schemes to relieve pressure on 
government finances.
14  The lesson of history is not that contagion occurred, but that 
the two countries suffered a common shock – the excessive debt created by the 
enormous expenses of the War of the Spanish Succession.   
                                                                                                                                                                         
12 Larry Neal, "How It All Began: the monetary and financial architecture of Europe 
during the first global markets, 1648-1815," Financial History Review, 7 (2000), pp. 
117-140. 
13 Kindleberger, 2000, pp. 77-78; 122-29), Edward Chancellor, Devil Take The 
Hindmost: A History of Financial Speculation, New York: Farrar, Straus and Girous, 
1999), ch. 3. 
14 Larry Neal, The rise of financial capitalism: international capital markets in the Age 
of Reason, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990; Antoin E. Murphy, John 
Law: Economic Theorist and Policy-maker, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997; John 
Carswell, The South Sea Bubble, rev. ed., London: Alan Sutton, 1993. The aftermath of the bubbles, however, laid the basis for the rise of an 
international capital market, increasingly centered in the city of London.  Most 
important for the future success of the capital markets in Britain, the huge mass of 
illiquid Irredeemable Ninety-nine Year Annuities that had constituted the major part of 
British national debt in 1719 had been largely converted by 1723 into liquid, easily 
tradable and transparently priced, South Sea annuities.  This greatly enlarged mass of 
tradable financial assets in the secondary market for securities in London preserved an 
active stock market in London, more than offsetting the effects of the Bubble Act of 
1720.   
The Bubble Act eliminated dealing in a welter of bubble companies that had 
sprung up in the previous speculative boom, but does not seem to have eliminated 
continued use of the joint-stock company for financing the continued expansion of 
British infrastructure – turnpikes, canals, docks, and waterworks.
15  The basic outlines 
of the Anglo-American structure of finance were set by 1723 – a complementary set of 
private commercial and merchant banks all enjoying continuous access to an active, 
liquid secondary market for financial assets, especially government debt.  The South 
Sea Bubble proved to be the "big bang" for financial capitalism in England.  In 1726, 
even the Bank of England had to acknowledge the success of the South Sea Company’s 
three percent perpetual annuity when it issued its own Three Per Cent Annuity.   
                                                            
15 Ronald Harris, Industrializing English Law: Entrepreneurship and Business 
Organization, 1720-1844, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Unfortunately for France, the collapse of the Mississippi Bubble there in 1720 
proved to be the end of secondary markets for financial assets in that country.
16  In the 
inflation that had accompanied Law’s efforts to create a market for the Mississippi 
company shares, French debtors had repaid their bonds in depreciated currency, 
inflicting large, and long-lasting, losses on French creditors.  Only a limited market for 
private debt arose after the currency reform of 1726, and that was a primary market 
mediated by the public notaries in Paris.
17  Amsterdam’s capital market survived the 
collapse of the mini-bubbles that had popped up there at the end of 1720, but continued 
to be fragmented among the various bonds issued by the Generalitet of the United 
Provinces and the individual cities and provinces.  Only the shares of the new marine 
insurance company created in response to the financial innovations in Paris and London 
remained as a new investment opportunity for Dutch savers.  For the most part, they 
focused first on the increasing issues of national debt created by the British 
government,
18 and then on bonds issued by various European governments after mid-
century.
19  The British French, and Dutch governments learned different lessons from 
the first international financial crisis. 
                                                            
16 Philip T. Hoffman, Gilles Postel-Vinay, and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Priceless 
Markets, The Political Economy of Credit in Paris, 1660-1870, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2000. 
17 Hoffman, Philip and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, “Redistribution and Long-Term Private 
Debt in Paris, 1660-1726,” Journal of Economic History, 55, (June 1995), pp. 256-84. 
18 P. G. M. Dickson, The financial revolution in England, a study in the development of 
public credit, 1688-1756, London: Macmillan, 1967. 
19 James C. Riley, International Government Finance and the Amsterdam Capital 
Market, Cambridge: at the University Press, 1980. IV. After the bubbles 
Financial crises in the remainder of the eighteenth century were caused by 
shocks from the aftermath of war finance, but usually had quite different effects among 
the financial centers of London, Amsterdam, and Paris.  During the Seven Years War 
(1756-63) that caused bankruptcies among the public notaries in Paris and put an end to 
the efforts of the most enterprising to become de facto bankers, the most spectacular 
military victories won by the British were in India.  The territorial gains there and 
rewards by grateful Indian princes yielded the promise of greatly increased profits for 
the East India Company.  Speculation could be financed in Amsterdam by drawing bills 
of exchange on the basis of credits expected from the Bank of England as it remitted 
bills payable in Amsterdam to support its mercenary troops on the Continent, as well as 
the troops of Frederick the Great.  This led to wisselruiterij, a Dutch version of check-
kiting (writing checks on a demand deposit before the check has cleared for the original 
deposit), that came to a sudden and widely embarrassing halt in 1763.  A chain of 
bankruptcies then occurred in Amsterdam and Hamburg, where the British subsidies 
had been directed.  According to Wilson, however, the crisis was short-lived and 
focused on the least reputable bankers.
 20  London bankers, who had not been involved 
in wisselsruiterij, perhaps due to a lack of opportunity or in sophistication in the use of 
the Wisselbank’s facilities, sent large shipments of specie to their most reliable 
correspondents.  The London bankers and the Bank of England also suspended 
temporarily requests for payment of their bills in Amsterdam.  The connections 
between the sources of public credit for the British government and the instruments of 
                                                            
20 Wilson, pp. 168-69. private credit for foreign trade between London and Amsterdam were thereby sustained 
and even strengthened.   
A similar liquidity crisis, however, occurred again in 1772, also the result of 
speculation on East India Company stock.  But the only response in the Amsterdam 
financial sector this time was to patch together a Loan Bank to serve as a form of 
deposit insurance by helping to recapitalize merchant banks that were temporarily 
illiquid.  Even the connections with the London capital market were weakened as Dutch 
rentiers withdrew their holdings of British national debt in favor of seeking placements 
in other European government debt.
21 
The learning experience of these first stock market bubbles and crashes varied, 
then, depending whether we take Britain, France, or the Netherlands as our object of 
study.  While Kindleberger asserts that the consequences were prolonged and 
destructive to all three economies, economic historians remark that the following 
quarter-century was one of remarkable prosperity for all three countries, chiefly due to 
the absence of major war until the War of the Austrian Succession.
22  The French 
financial system was weakened permanently, however, while the British benefited from 
the creation of a liquid secondary market for successive issues of its national debt and 
the Dutch connection with London benefited both.
23  The case for a lender of last resort 
is strongest in the French experience, weakest in the British, unless one thinks of the 
reorganization of the South Sea Company in 1723 as a delayed action of a reluctant 
                                                            
21 Riley, (1980). 
22 James Tracy, ed., The Rise of Merchant Empires, 1500-1800, Cambridge: at the 
University Press, 1990.   
23 Neal, "How It All Began." lender of last resort – the Bank of England acting under political duress from the 
administration of Robert Walpole. 
V. The First Latin American Debt Crisis in 1825 
After the disruptions to financial markets caused by the French Revolution and 
the wars that ensued until 1815, the London stock exchange emerged as the dominant 
capital market in the world.  The first foray of British investors into international 
finance, however, ended in disaster with the crash of 1825.  The origins of the 1825 
crisis began with the withdrawal of foreigners from the British national debt after the 
war.  Following the final defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815, capital flowed back 
to the European continent from Great Britain.  Foreign holdings of British debt 
diminished rapidly, the price of Consols rose as the supply diminished, and prices of 
Bank and East India stock rose in tandem.  British investors used to safe returns ranging 
between 4 and 6 percent for the past 20 years now found their options limited to yields 
between 3.5 and 4.5 percent.  The opportunities for investment in new issues of French 
five percent rentes were more attractive than continuing their holdings in Consols.   
Indeed, the rentes maintained a steady return over five percent throughout the crisis 
period and offered a stable alternative to the British funds.   
Baring Brothers and Co., by its successful finance of Wellington’s army in 
1815, had established itself as the dominant merchant bank in England.  By undertaking 
the flotation of the first two issues of French rentes sold to pay the reparations and 
support Wellington’s occupation forces, Barings became the “Sixth Power” in Europe, 
according to the Duc de Richelieu.
24  From February to July 1817, Barings disposed of 
three loans, the first two at a net price of 53 for 100 million francs each and the third at 65 which raised 115 million francs.  Yet, according to the historian of the Baring firm, 
no disturbance in the British trade balance or in French reserves seems to have occurred 
— the inflow of capital to France from Britain from the issue of rentes seems to have 
been offset by indemnity payments and army contracts from France to Britain.
25  (What 
the historian has missed, of course, is the fall in the exchange rate of the British pound 
that occurred at the time; the pound was still floating after the suspension of 
convertibility in February 1797.)  From this success for British investors in foreign 
investment with the French rentes, it has traditionally been argued, came increased 
enthusiasm for other forms of investment, first in the bonds issued by the new 
government of Spain established in 1820, and then in the bonds issued by the new 
states emerging in Latin America.
26  
The collapse of Spanish control over its American empire during the 
Napoleonic Wars led to a variety of independent states being formed out of the former 
colonies by 1820.  Battling one another for control over strategic transport routes, 
mainly rivers and ports, and over state enterprises, mainly mines, each appealed to 
foreign investors as a source of government finance and as a means to substitute foreign 
expertise and technology for the vanquished Spanish.  Their government bonds and 
their mining shares found a ready market in the London Stock Exchange, which had 
become the dominant market place for finance capital in the world during the 
                                                                                                                                                                         
24 Jenks, p. 36.  See also Ziegler, pp. 100-111. 
25 Jenks, p. 37. 
26 While the focus for foreign loans was mostly on Spain and Spanish America, 
literature buffs may be forgiven for thinking instead of Greece, which received a loan 
and much-needed publicity for its then premature efforts to break away from Turkish 
rule.  Over 50 years later, when the Greek government was attempting to assure the 
international community it would go on a gold standard, part of its commitment was to 
resume payment on these initial bonds! Napoleonic Wars.  The loan bubble of 1822-25 ensued, eventually giving British 
foreign bondholders their first experience with defaults by sovereign states.  None of 
the new Latin American states emerging from the remains of the Spanish empire 
(Brazil remained part of the Portuguese empire) found the means, whether by exports 
or taxes, to service the debts they had incurred in London.  Meanwhile, they dissipated 
rapidly in military conflicts with neighboring states the net proceeds they received after 
the bonds were sold at discount and they had paid large commissions up front to the 
London investment houses.
27 
From 1822, when both Chile and Colombia floated bond issues with London 
agents, an increasing number of Latin American governments tried to find the means 
for financing their transition to independence from the flush pockets of British 
investors.  The bonds they issued, in terms of the amounts actually paid up, as 
distinguished from the amounts actually received by the governments, were the largest 
single category of new investment in the London capital market in this period.
28  It is 
true, even so, that the amount was small relative to the remaining sum of the British 
government’s funded debt -- £43 million compared to £820 million.
29 
Figure 1 compares the prices of several bond issues of the emerging South 
American states, as given in James Wetenhall’s semi-weekly Course of the Exchange.  
                                                            
27 Dawson (1990) provides a readable account of this episode, but Marichal (1989) puts 
it into a longer run Latin American perspective.  Brazilians point with pride that their 
bonds never went into default, which is why their prices remained the highest among 
the Latin American bonds in the late 1820s.  The Brazilian bonds, in fact, were the only 
ones issued by the Rothschilds.  None of their government bond issues for Austria, 
Belgium, Naples, Prussia, or Russia defaulted in this period.  (Doubleday, p. 281). 
28 Gayer, Rostow, Schwartz, vol. I, p. 189. 
29 Gayer, Rostow, and Schwartz, vol. I, p. 408, fn. 8 and Abstract of British Historical 
Statistics, p. 402.  These are nominal values in each case, but government debt was then 
trading at close to par, so its market value was roughly the same. At the peak of the stock market boom, there was surprising convergence in the prices of 
all the Latin American bonds.  It was only in the ensuing two years that information on 
the fiscal capacity of the individual governments and their respective economic bases 
enabled the London market to distinguish among them.  Mexico and the Andean 
countries were clearly marked to be disaster cases by the end of 1828, while already 
Argentina and Brazil were demonstrating their attractiveness to British investors, an 
allure that would increase until the Baring crisis of 1890.  
To see if this early financial crisis is properly another example of contagion, we 
have analyzed the cross-correlations of various asset prices in the London Stock 
Exchange during the first Latin American debt crisis in the 1820s, which led to the 
financial crisis of December 1825.  Using the prices of the Three Percent Consol as the 
reference security, Table 1 shows that correlations were quite high before the crisis 
between the price of Consols, a general index of stock market prices, the price of 
French rentes (a seasoned foreign security), and the first Latin American bonds issued 
by Colombia and Chile.  After the crisis, correlations broke down and, contrary to the 
recent stock market crises, the variance of the reference asset in this case actually 
declined.  Consequently, adjusting for heteroscedasticity actually increases the 
likelihood of finding evidence of contagion, but even so the hypothesis of contagion 
from the collapse of Latin American bond prices to the stock market index, or mature 
bond markets, is resoundingly rejected.   
The lesson learned by the British government in this case was to make major 
changes in the financial structure of Britain, reforming the bankruptcy law, repealing 
the Bubble Act of 1720, forcing the Bank of England to open branches in the major commercial and industrial cities, while maintaining the gold standard, and avoiding 
most Latin American involvements for another quarter-century.  If the Bank of England 
acted as a lender of last resort, it was erratic, belated, and ultimately inadequate.
30  In 
the view of modern economic historians, however, this set the stage for the true 
industrial revolution in the British economy – the beginning of sustained increases in 
per capita income, increases sustained to the present day.  It may be, then, that other 
reforms in the financial architecture of a country can compensate for the absence of an 
effective lender of last resort. 
VI. The Gold Standard Emerges 
Meanwhile, European countries took note of the superiority of the British public 
financial system that Britain had conclusively demonstrated during the Napoleonic 
wars from 1803 to 1815.  The lesson was clear, but adapting the British system to 
Continental conditions was a slow and painful process, marked by numerous setbacks 
as European governments clung as long as possible to their traditional fiscal regimes, 
monetary standards, and financial institutions.  Over the course of the nineteenth 
century, the individual European nation-states gradually moved as best they could 
toward an imitation of the obviously successful British system of public finance.   
Issuing perpetual annuities backed by the permanent taxing authority of an elected 
Parliament was a key element in the British system, but the reigning monarchs of 
Europe only reluctantly ceded authority over taxation to their parliaments.   
Constraining the growth of the money supply with a credible rule such as the 
gold standard was also important, not least to maintain the market value of the debt 
issued by a government.  But no country was willing to follow the British example of a 
                                                            
30 Comments by Michael Bordo, on Neal (1997). gold standard, set in 1821, until little Portugal adopted gold as its monetary standard in 
1854.  Then it took the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 to get united Germany to adopt a 
gold standard to replace the varieties of silver standards among the various German 
states.  France, and its major trading partners in Europe, persisted with the bimetallic 
standard, maintaining a mint ratio of 15.5:1 of silver to gold until 1871.  Then, the flood 
of German silver on the market as the German Empire replaced the silver coinage with 
either gold or token coins led France and the other members of the Latin Monetary 
Union to demonetize silver, effectively adopting the gold standard as well after 1879.
31  
With the adoption by 1880 of a nearly universal regime of fixed exchange rates 
within Europe, a truly European – and Atlantic – wide financial market arose quickly, 
which came to encompass much of Latin America (Argentina and Brazil) and Asia 
(India) as well as Australia.
32  It served well to finance an impressive surge of 
international trade as well as labor and capital movements that remain benchmarks for 
today's global market place.  The trade, labor, and capital movements of the period 
were clearly driven by technological revolutions in steam-driven transport, electrical 
communication, and agricultural mechanization.
33  All of these epochal changes placed 
immense new demands upon the international financial markets as well, which in turn 
expanded rapidly their depth and range of services.   
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33 Kevin H. O'Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, Globalization and History: The 
Evolution of a Nineteenth Century Atlantic Economy, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1999. While previous analysts have focused on either the bond market,
34 as an 
indicator of long-term capital movements, or on exchange rates as an indicator of 
credible commitment to the gold standard,
35 we have chosen to focus on the open 
market interest rates for three-month accommodation bills, which were reported weekly 
in the Economist newspaper.  While the discount rates at the public banks of issue on 
the European continent remained sticky compared to the Bank of England, the open 
market rates were much more responsive to market conditions.  Table 2 demonstrates 
dramatically how much more volatile were short-term interest rates on three-month 
trade bills than the long-term interest rates on the respective government bonds.  For the 
five countries shown, the standard deviation of the short-term rates we use for our 
analysis of the transmission of financial crises were several times greater than the 
standard deviation of the long-term rates.  In the cases of Britain and Germany, the 
difference was nearly ten times.  In the statistical analysis below, we concentrate on 
correlations of movements in interest rates in this short-term capital market.  It was the 
short-term capital market that had the greatest volume of trading activity, financing not 
only the continually rising volume of domestic and foreign trade arising from the 
transportation revolution of the steam age, but also the temporary liquidity needs of 
financial intermediaries.  This so-called “money market” was precisely where we 
expect pressures from liquidity demands by banks to be expressed, raising discount 
rates when demands for cash surged and lowering discount rates when the supply of 
case was plentiful.  Indeed, even Kindleberger notes that it was the short-term capital 
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2000, New York, Basic Books, 2001, Bordo and Murshid, op. cit. market that was the usual, and most effective, transmission mechanism for the 
examples of contagion he cites, which become exceptionally numerous in this period.
36 
The analysis below draws upon the extensive data set we have compiled 
specifically for this study. The data set comprises weekly observations on prices of 
long-term government bonds and interest rates on three month, prime quality trade bills 
determined in national capital markets and the discount rates charged by their public 
banks for fourteen countries over the period January 1, 1870 through June 27, 1914.  
(see Data Appendix for a full description.)  Including over 100,000 observations, this 
rich data set, now available to researchers, can be used for detailed analyses of the 
transmission process of financial disturbances in the world's first global financial 
market.  We use it in this study to focus on the issue of whether contagion characterized 
the financial crises of the gold standard period.  Table 3 show the dates of the crises and 
the periods we analyze pre- and post-crisis. 
VII. The Crisis of 1873 
We begin with the 1873 crisis, which is considered to have started in Germany 
and Austria but amplified by the repercussions in the United States, still in the 
greenback period.  Table 4 shows the correlation coefficients between the market 
interest rates on call money in New York and, respectively, Paris, Berlin, Amsterdam, 
Brussels, Vienna, Petersburg, and three-month bills in London.
37  Germany had just 
                                                                                                                                                                         
35 Michael D. Bordo and Ronald MacDonald, “Violations of the `Rules of the Game' 
and the Credibility of the Classical Gold Standard, 1880-1914,“ NBER Working Paper 
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37 All interest rate data for the period 1873-1914 were de-seasonalized using the 
ESMOOTH facility in RATS, which is based on the Holt-Winters Exponential 
Smoothing Algorithm. adopted the gold standard formally, but was still in the process of replacing the silver 
coinage.  Paris, Amsterdam, Brussels and Vienna were bimetallic but suffering the 
aftershock of Germany’s switch from silver to gold and the flood of silver coming into 
their mints.   
The last column in Table 4 indicates whether there is evidence of contagion (C) 
or not (N) between the London market rate and the market rate of the country in 
question.  None of the seven cases show contagion on the Forbes and Rigobon 
criterion, after adjusting for heteroscedasticity, although Austria does increase its 
correlation considerably while failing the one-sided T-statistic test of +1.65.  While we 
have taken the US as the source of the crisis, Kindleberger might well argue that 
Austria was the source.  It certainly was the weakest financial sector, with the Austria-
Hungarian Monarchy struggling with the aftermath of its defeat at the hands of Prussia 
in 1866 and the triumph of the German Reich establishing a gold standard in 1871.  
Rather than a case of possible contagion, Austria's apparent response to the US crisis 
can also be interpreted as a defensive reaction in common with the US to maintain their 
gold stocks in response to German pressures. 
These statistical measures of contagion are completely at odds with the standard 
story of the 1873 crisis.  According to Kindleberger, the crisis was initiated by the 
speculative excesses in Germany resulting from the reparations payments extracted 
from France after its defeat in 1870; the German mania spilled over into Austria in 
1871 and 1872.  Both stock market bubbles collapsed in May 1873, with contagion 
spreading to Italy, Holland, and Belgium, eventually taking in the US in September 1873.
38  If that was a process of contagion, then we should have found the correlation 
of Austria and the US falling after the collapse of Jay Cook's firm in September 1873, 
not rising as it did.  The panic in the US, which we take as the crisis point, was 
followed by a worldwide depression in trade and economic activity that lasted until 
1879, and which encompassed France and Russia, neither of which shared in the initial 
euphoria and so were exempted from the crash.   
The cases of Austria and the United States show that, even in the absence of a 
lender of last resort or any close substitute for the actions of such a lender, effective 
steps were taken to limit their correlations with the epicenter of the crisis, Germany in 
this case.  Other unpleasant economic consequences followed from their respective 
resolves to hasten deflation and return to a fixed metallic standard (the US in 1879 
when the economy picked up again and Austria not until the early 1900s when it was 
finally successful in shadowing the gold standard).  Financial contagion, however, was 
not, on our reading of the statistical evidence in the short-term capital markets of the 
time, part of the picture, but the gold standard system was incomplete, still in its 
formative years. 
VIII. The Crisis of 1890 
The Baring crisis of 1890 forced Portugal and Argentina off the gold standard, 
while leaving Britain breathing a collective sigh of relief in the financial sector.   
Governor Lidderdale of the Bank of England coordinated a swap of equity for debt 
among the major banking houses of London so they could take over much of the Baring 
business while forestalling a run on them by their clients.  But as he admitted freely, his 
                                                            
38 Kindleberger, 2000, pp. 131-32.   efforts would likely have failed had it not been for the pledges of support by the 
Banque de France and the British government.
39  What seems surprising at first glance 
is that the gold centers experienced much more volatile market and bank rates through 
these three crisis years than did the smaller, more vulnerable trading centers such as 
Vienna, Madrid, and Genoa.  Figures 2a and 2b highlight the contrast in performance 
by the respective money markets of the core and periphery countries in Europe.  The 
much lower volatility of both the bank and market rates in the periphery countries 
compared to the bank and money rates in the core countries persisted right through the 
crisis year of 1890, the effects of which are impossible to discern in Figure 2b.   
–Figures 2a and 2b about here– 
The explanation of lower volatility in the periphery than the core cannot be that 
only the credit markets of the large industrial countries were affected by the crisis; trade 
intensity among the European continental countries was still rising in the 1880s despite 
signs of reversal in the free trade movement that had begun in the 1860s.  It seems self-
evident that the less advanced countries were using their public banks to limit access to 
trade credit through informal credit rationing.  Their implicit capital controls were 
clearly effective, as their respective money markets mirrored faithfully both the stable 
levels and the low volatility of the very stable bank rates.  Arthur Bloomfield (1959, p. 
28) identified the variety of informal capital controls that central banks employed when 
under duress in the gold standard period, although he hesitated to draw any definite 
conclusions about the policy implications of his anecdotal evidence.  Joseph 
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Pressnell, “Gold Reserves, Banking Reserves and the Baring Crisis of 1890,” in C. R. 
Whittlesey and J. S. G. Wilson, eds., Essays in Money and Banking in Honour of R. S. 
Sayers, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968). Schumpeter, on the other hand, asserted that every commercial bank was assigned a 
ration and “such ration was cyclically varied as well as currently revised.”
40  T h e  
question is whether the behavior of the periphery countries changed over time with 
experience or with changes in circumstance?  
We have even more data on short-term interest rates with which to examine the 
possibility of contagion from the financial crisis of 1890, which may have started with a 
banking crisis in the US in October, leading to exacerbation of Baring’s difficulties 
with Argentina in November of that year.  Table 5 gives the results for twelve trading 
partners, most of whom were on the gold standard at this point, the main exception 
being Portugal, which left the gold standard in 1890.  The only two cases of possible 
contagion are Russia and the United States, but again this may be interpreted as a 
defensive reaction as in the earlier crisis of 1873.  Russia did not formally commit to a 
gold standard until the reforms of Sergei Witte in 1896.  The correlations of short-term 
interest rates in these gold standard markets with the London market were higher, 
typically, than in 1873 both before and after the crisis of 1890, reflecting the increase in 
short-term capital flows that accompanied the spread of the gold standard.   
Our results can be compared with those reported by Bordo and Murshid (1999), 
who analyzed the correlation patterns on government bond prices for eight countries 
before and after the first crisis in April 1890 when the Banco de la Nacion stopped 
dividend payments, provoking a run on all Argentine banks, and then before and after 
the November failure of Baring Brothers.  Only in the case of Argentine and British 
bonds did they find an increase in correlations and then only after the April crisis within 
Argentina, suggesting the unlikely case that contagion spread from Argentina to 
                                                            
40  (Bloomfield, p. 29, citing Schumpeter, Business Cycles, New York, 1939, p. 651. Britain, or that Argentine bonds became absorbed by the reorganized and recapitalized 
Barings firm.  Both their results and ours indicate that the actions of the Governor of 
the Bank of England in re-organizing Barings while supporting their depositors limited 
the fallout from this crisis to the English banking establishment in the short run.  It may 
have had more widespread influences, however, in the medium and long-run, due to the 
interconnections of the various money markets that had arisen. 
IX. The Crisis of 1893 
To see the longer-term effects of the 1890 experience we are fortunate that 
another, more serious and more widespread, financial crisis struck in 1893.  Figures 3a 
and 3b show how the short-term credit markets in Europe responded to this crisis.  The 
volatility of bank rates among the core gold standard countries was nearly as stable 
during this crisis as in the periphery countries, most of whom were merely shadowing 
the gold standard at this time.  Portugal had abandoned it, Russia and Austria had not 
yet adopted it, Italy was about to drop it and Spain never would adopt it formally.  The 
real contrast in this crisis came in the open market rates, which as in the previous crisis 
of 1890 were much more volatile in the core countries than in the periphery.  We take 
this again as evidence that credit rationing was effectively administered in the periphery 
countries, implying de facto capital controls in the periphery, but exposure to external 
market pressures in the core.   
Additional evidence in support of our interpretation of the contrasting results for 
core and periphery countries in Europe comes from the Australian case in 1893.  For 
Australian economic development, the crisis of 1893 has been interpreted as a major 
turning point.  The large number of branch banks that had financed Australia's "long boom" over the preceding quarter century had to suspend payments for varying periods 
during the year 1893 and to consolidate services when they resumed.  Despite the 
internal turmoil in the domestic payments system that was occurring, the discount rates 
in Melbourne, Sydney, and Adelaide remained rock solid throughout the year and the 
following years.  Indeed, the only sign of trouble that we can pick up in our financial 
data from the Economist newspaper is that it stopped reporting the Australian data 
altogether in 1894.  It was in London’s bill market, where most of the Australian banks 
had their headquarters, that the action occurred. 
–Figures 3a and 3b about here– 
The crisis of 1893, originating in the United States with a banking crisis 
combined with a currency crisis created by the Silver Purchase Act of 1893 included 
Australia, Italy, and Germany in its extent, according to Bordo and Eichengreen.  In the 
short-term capital markets, however, it appears to have created contagion in only 3 of 
the 12 cases analyzed in Table 6.  Only the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland 
were affected apparently.  All three small countries had essentially no correlation at all 
with the very volatile call money rates of the US before the crisis, unlike Italy, France, 
and Austria.  But after the crisis, their correlation with US call money rates shot up 
significantly.  The odd thing about this crisis, however, is that the variance of the 
central capital market actually fell during the crisis period compared to the precrisis 
period – from 0.442 to 0.255.  If we were to take the London three month bill rate as 
the epicenter of the crisis instead, we would still have the same problem – a decline in 
variance so that the adjustment of the correlation coefficient for increased variance 
should actually be reversed, reducing the precrisis correlation.  The same conclusion, nevertheless, would emerge – somehow the crisis of 1893 increased the 
interdependence of the short-term capital markets in the Atlantic trading world for three 
of the smaller, but very open, economies in Europe while decreasing it for the major 
economies of France, Italy and Great Britain.  
We believe this may again be a defensive reaction limited to the smaller 
countries with smaller gold reserves at their disposal, compared to the major countries.  
This may be a further demonstration that the pressures upon the gold standard’s 
viability as an international monetary system were becoming extreme by that time as 
the American and German economies expanded rapidly and increased their holdings of 
monetary gold.  While the discovery of new sources of gold in South Africa and Alaska 
in the following years eased the pressures overall from 1897 to the outbreak of World 
War I, the financial techniques developed by continental bankers in imitation of the 
British example were also important.  We return to this point in our conclusion after 
examining the case, or not, for contagion in the following international financial crises, 
starting with the one major international financial crisis during the period of gold 
inflation, 1897-1914. 
X. The Crisis of 1907 
After 1897, gold inflation relieved the pressures imposed upon monetary 
authorities committed either formally or informally to fixed exchange rates under the 
gold standard system.  Not only did currency crises remain on the sideline, but the 
frequency of banking crises diminished as well.  The crisis of 1907, however, was very 
serious and its effects widespread, extending from the US to Germany and Italy.   
Figures 4a and 4b contrast the results for the core and now a much expanded membership in the periphery.  Even with the greater numbers of centers reporting to the 
Economist  newspaper by this time, however, the same stability of bank rates and 
corresponding market rates in the periphery countries remains in sharp contrast to the 
volatility of market rates in the core countries.  Moreover, bank rates were more 
responsive in the 1907 crisis as more central banks began either to imitate the practices 
of the Bank of England, or to take defensive measures in response to the Bank’s 
frequent changes of discount rate.  
–Figures 4a and 4b about here– 
In the midst of the gold inflation period from 1897 to 1914, occurred the most 
severe and widespread financial crisis before World War I.  No doubt that its origin was 
the United States, but the financial interdependence already developed within the gold 
standard area meant that its effects were quickly transmitted abroad.  While the crisis 
that caught everyone’s attention was the banking crisis with the failure of the 
Knickerbocker Trust Company of New York in October 1907, the ultimate cause of the 
crisis was likely the San Francisco earthquake in April 1906.
41  Naturally, the physical 
destruction caused by the earthquake put immediate demands upon the financial 
resources of first the California, then the US economy.  It was not until October 1906, 
however, that these pressures were transmitted to London, but then the pressures were 
sudden and overwhelming as over £50 million of gold were shipped in that month from 
London to the US.  The cause was the reluctant decisions by British insurance 
companies to pay out on the claims lodged by their San Francisco insurees.  While the 
insurance companies had initially claimed that the losses of property in San Francisco were caused by the earthquake, and not by the fires that followed immediately, so they 
were not liable for payments, they realized that US courts would certainly rule against 
them.  They began payments in October, dealing with six months of accumulated 
claims.   
The effect was two-fold: first the Bank of England raised the discount rate 
sharply, and second, when it lowered the discount rate in January 1907 it refused to 
discount any bills originating from the United States.  Ultimately, this cut off New 
York trust companies from their usual source of funds for financing liquidity demands 
in the fall.  The fall of 1907 saw another large outflow of gold from London to the US, 
and this time the response was felt throughout the capital market, transmitting quickly 
to Germany, France, and Italy.   
Table 7 shows how dramatic this final episode of the gold standard was for the 
global financial system of the time.  The increase in variance of short-term interest rates 
in the London market was the greatest experienced in the entire gold standard period.  
The evidence of contagion is nearly universal in Europe – only the Scandinavian gold 
bloc remained impervious, along with the US, India, and Spain.  Forbes and Rigobon 
might classify these results for 1907 as less an example of contagion, however, than of 
an aggregate shock affecting all the financial centers of the gold standard.  The problem 
with that explanation, of course, is the anomalous case of the United States, the very 
epicenter of the crisis.  But this may be a another case where our statistical test is too 
rigorous, as the t-statistic of 1.48 is even closer to the critical value of 1.65 than the 
case of Austria in 1873.  But if the US financial market was subjected to special 
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Aftershock: The 1906 San Francisco Earthquake and the Panic of 1907,” unpublished discrimination in this crisis, excluded from the London discount market precisely in the 
year before the crisis of October 1907, the US anomaly is explained.  Effectively, the 
UK interest rate against the US bills of exchange was infinity.   
We have, then, a historical example of what can happen when a country is 
excluded from an interdependent financial system precisely when its financial needs are 
greatest, as is always the case when a major, unexpected, and unpredictable “bolt from 
the blue” hits an economy.  When interdependence is already high, attempts to shelter 
the rest of international system from an idiosyncratic shock in one financial center are 
likely to prove fruitless.  With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that the European 
centers might have been better off if they had come to the aid of San Francisco, or their 
own insurance companies, promptly.  Of course, if all the governments concerned were 
nursing their reserves of gold in case  a major war were to break out, their  actual 
reaction is understandable. 
XI. The greatest financial crisis of all: 1929–33  
The issues touched on in our discussion of historical crises are motivated, of 
course, by our awareness of the tragic consequences of the Great Depression of 1929-
33, which all analysts agree was initiated by a truly international financial crisis and 
most acknowledge that the consequences – economic, political, and social – were long-
lasting and dire.  Here is where Kindleberger’s argument for a lender of last resort has 
its greatest force.  Thanks to cooperation between Montagu Norman, Governor of the 
Bank of England, and Benjamin Strong, Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, a working version of the pre-World War I gold standard had been built up over 
                                                                                                                                                                         
paper, 2001. the years 1924-28.  While it worked, this “gold exchange standard” provided the 
financial basis for an expansion of international trade and rapid economic recovery in 
the major industrial economies.  But when a liquidity crisis struck, basically because 
world agricultural prices fell making it impossible for farmers from the plains of 
Nebraska to the pampas of Argentina to the steppes of Hungary to make payments on 
the debts they had incurred, there was no lender of last resort around.  The Bank of 
England was willing, but incapable with its limited resources, to serve in this role.  The 
Federal Reserve System of the United States was capable, but unwilling to play that 
role, given its dysfunctional internal decision-making procedures.
42   
Our view of this terminal crisis of the gold standard era is that the entire period 
from the outbreak of World War I in late July 1914 until the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system of fixed exchange rates in mid-August 1971 was the antithesis of 
globalization.  The work of Jeffrey Williamson on convergence of real wages, which 
made substantial progress in the gold standard years and came to halt in the 1914-45 
period, confirms this view.  The study of capital movements and the various measures 
of capital market integration by Alan Taylor and Maurice Obstfeld identifies this period 
as one of “de-globalization” as well.  Only the brief interlude of 1924-28, which W. A. 
Lewis called “the five good years” in his history of the interwar period, had any 
resemblance to the global economy and its methods of operation that had arisen in the 
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Angeles, 1986), as well as in Manias, Panics, and Crashes and many other places. half-century before World War I.  And that was based on a flawed financial structure 
that could not have endured.
43   
From this perspective, which we share with Kindleberger, the key financial 
crisis was not the Wall Street panic in October 1929, but the failure of the Kreditanstalt 
Bank in Austria, announced on May 11, 1931.  The contagion effects in this crisis were 
the worst possible for globalization as they consisted of payment defaults that led to a 
widening circle of exchange controls and a downward spiral of international trade.  But 
in terms of our indicators of contagion, there would be little or no effect, much as we 
found for the crisis of 1873, at the beginning of the gold standard era.   
Indeed, Bordo and Murshid find a similar outcome in their analysis of 
correlations of bond prices for 21 countries before and after each of three crises they 
identify in the 1929-33 period.  These are the Wall Street crash in October 1929, 
Britain’s departure from the gold standard in September 1931, and the US law passed in 
May 1933 that allowed devaluation of the US dollar.  In general, they find little 
evidence of contagion, especially after adjusting for the increase in volatility of the 
British bond prices after September 1931.  The only cases that seem to show contagion 
are Greece and Finland after the US devaluation in 1933, but these may reflect more the 
importance of US holdings of Greek and Finnish bonds than Kindleberger-style 
scramble for liquidity.  
XII. Lessons Learned from De-globalization 
Nevertheless, the lessons learned are still being discussed today.  The idea that 
the periphery countries always suffer relative to the core countries, a hint of which 
                                                            
43 Eichengreen, Golden Fetters, is the classic analysis of the plight of the gold exchange comes from the Bordo-Murshid findings, was articulated most effectively by Mihail 
Manoilescu, a Romanian economist appalled by the damage suffered by Romania as it 
tried to follow French advice by staying on the gold standard as long as possible while 
rejecting offers of markets for its oil from Nazi Germany.  Manoilescu’s ideas found a 
receptive audience in Argentina, where Raul Prebisch, a young economist in the central 
bank of Argentina, was similarly appalled at the damage to Argentina’s export 
economy caused by following British advice.  Prebisch’s ideas persisted long 
afterwards, thanks to his influence in the Economic Commission of Latin America.
44   
After the failure of the World Economic Conference in 1933, the world divided 
up into mutually exclusive trading blocs – the sterling area with its imperial preference, 
the reichsmark bloc based on bilateral exchange agreements, the Japanese led “Asian 
co-prosperity sphere”, and the autarkic economies of the Soviet Union and fascist 
Spain, Italy, and Portugal.  These assorted regional trading blocs and the attempts by 
Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan to expand their regions to become entirely self-
sufficient were important elements in the economic background conditions that set the 
stage for the tragedies of World War II.  Whether all this could have been avoided by a 
lender of last resort acting at the critical crisis (Wall Street crash? Kreditanstalt 
collapse? Britain leaving gold? US devaluation?) seems doubtful. 
What was needed, in Kindleberger’s view, was an economic and political 
hegemon, a role willingly adopted by the United States after World War, as it took the 
lead in establishing the Bretton Woods system, based on the institutions of the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, with increasing efforts to make the 
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44 Joseph Love, “Manilescu and the development of core-periphery thought,”   patchwork General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade become effective, eventually 
turning into the World Trade Organization.  The results of the Bretton Woods era, 
essentially 1958-71 when it was fully functioning as planned, were remarkably good, as 
shown by Bordo.
45  In particular, financial crises were limited to the occasional 
currency crisis when a country, usually Britain, could no longer sustain its dollar peg, 
but these were confined to the country of origin thanks to capital controls so there was 
never an issue of contagion.  But the monetary basis of the Bretton Woods system, the 
dollar exchange standard with the dollar fixed in price relative to gold, was also fatally 
flawed, essentially because the costs of maintaining political hegemony for the US 
undermined its ability to act as economic hegemon.  After its sudden collapse in 1971, 
the disintermediation created by the worldwide inflation that followed led to the rise 
once again of international capital markets, this time in a world of fiat currencies and 
floating exchange rates, leading to a new series of international financial crises that 
began to emerge in the late 1980s as capital controls were increasingly lifted. 
XIII. The new financial crises: 1987, 1994, 1997 
The Asian crises started in July 1997 with the collapse of the Thai currency, the 
baht, as the Bank of Thailand ran out of dollar reserves needed to maintain its peg with 
the dollar.  They quickly spread to other East Asian countries including Malaysia, 
Indonesia, the Philippines and, with a lag, South Korea, making a strong case for 
financial contagion in the global capital market.  IMF Staff Papers and the World 
Economic Outlook have repeatedly referred to the Asian crisis as a prime example of 
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Bordo and Eichengreen, eds., A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System, Chicago: 
Univbersityof Chicago Press, 1992. “contagion”.  IMF loans made to Argentina and Turkey in 2001 were given credit for 
preventing contagion spreading from the financial difficulties in those countries.   
Further, recovery has been slow, complicated by political difficulties in each country, 
although the sharp devaluations of each currency have moderated the fall in GDP.   
The most powerful statistical evidence in support of the contagion hypothesis is 
Baig and Goldfajn (1999).  They use the criterion that if correlations among countries’ 
financial markets increase significantly after a crisis, contagion has occurred.   
Analyzing the correlations among the five afflicted countries for foreign exchange 
rates, equity market indexes, interest rates, and prices of government bonds, both before 
and after the crisis, they find strong evidence of contagion in the currency and 
government bond markets.  They find mixed evidence of contagion in the equity 
markets, until they control for country-specific events and other fundamentals, 
whereupon contagion appears to have occurred.  Certainly, the financial press drew 
similar conclusions and it may be that managers of emerging market mutual funds 
decided to cut back their exposures to all Asian markets, anticipating contagion in a 
self-fulfilling action. 
Another argument, however, could be that all five countries were victims of a 
common shock, namely the sharp rise in the value of the US dollar relative to the 
Japanese yen, a rise that began in 1996.  All five countries had pegged their currencies 
to the dollar and in the early 1990s, when the dollar was falling relative to the yen, all 
five had profited by expanding their exports into markets previously dominated by the 
Japanese.  Several also gained from Japanese investment in their economies as Japanese 
firms relocated production facilities into Thailand and Malaysia.  These advantages turned to disadvantages when the dollar began to rise sharply against the yen and the 
European currencies.  This would not have caused a crisis by itself – Singapore, 
Taiwan, and Hong Kong also had pegged their currencies to the US dollar – but the five 
crisis countries also had incredibly weak banking systems caused by financing long-
term property investments with short-term loans denominated in dollars.   
A more substantive objection to the contagion scenario is due to the work of 
Forbes and Rigobon (1999).  They examine the cases of the US stock market crash in 
October 1987, the Mexican peso crisis in 1994, and the East Asian crises in 1997.
46  
Unlike Baig and Goldfajn, however, Forbes and Rigobon adjust their post-crisis 
correlations for the increase in volatility that also occurred and which biases upward 
standard measures of correlation.  Making the appropriate adjustment for 
heteroscedasticity in their correlation measures, they conclude that for stock market 
indexes, at least, interdependence was already high before the crises in question and 
remained high afterwards, showing that contagion did not appear to have been a factor 
even in these cases.  If it had existed, the degree of correlation among the stock markets 
would have increased after the crisis, independent of the increase in variance.   
Moreover, they find that when correlations among stock market indices are adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity in the previous crises of 1987 and 1994, contagion does not appear to 
have been a factor then either.   
For example, calculating correlation coefficients between indexes of stock 
market values in 27 countries during the East Asian crisis of 1997, they find evidence 
of contagion in 15 of the cases.  Adjusting for the increase in variance that occurred in the various markets after July 1997, however, they eliminate the evidence of contagion 
in all but one case – Italy.  And that case is more likely due to Italy’s reentry into the 
European Monetary System in November 1996, reducing exchange risk with the rest of 
European stock markets, than any psychological fears overtaking Italian investors.   
Performing the same adjustment on correlation coefficients among stock market 
indexes before and after two other major financial crises – the October 1987 collapse of 
the New York Stock Exchange and the collapse of the Mexican peso in late 1994 – 
Forbes and Rigobon systematically eliminate statistical evidence of contagion.  Their 
conclusion is that “Contagion is not simply a high cross-market correlation after a 
shock.  It is a significant increase in this correlation after the shock.  The high levels of 
co-movement across many stock markets during these three tumultuous periods reflects 
a continuation of strong cross-market linkages, and not a significant shift in these 
linkages.” [p. 35]  As they  find high levels of correlation before each crisis as well as 
after, they direct our attention to the causes of interdependence across international 
equity markets even in periods of relative stability.  These cross-market linkages, they 
suggest, make today’s financial markets especially vulnerable to shocks.  Kindleberger 
should approve of this conclusion, although he might shy away from substituting 
“interdependence” for “contagion” in future writings.   
Bordo and Murshid also examine the behavior of long-term government bonds 
for the Mexican peso crisis in 1994 and the Asian banking/currency crisis of 1997.  
Like Forbes and Rigobon, they find little evidence of increased correlation in 
government bond markets after each crisis.  The only case of increased correlation with 
                                                                                                                                                                         
46 Kristin Forbes and Roberto Rigobon, “No Contagion, Only Interdependence: 
Measuring Stock Market Co-Movements, NBER Working Paper 7267, Cambridge, the Thai government bonds after July 1997 turns out to be Brazilian bonds and US 
bonds. (Table 5B)  Nevertheless, they do find some evidence that correlations with 
emerging market government bonds do increase relative to correlations with developed 
country government bonds after both the Mexican and Asian crises.  (Tables 6A and 
6B)
47  As the current debate over the IMF’s role as a potential lender of last resort 
continues, we are obviously still extracting lessons from current experiences.  What 
insight, then, might be taken from our findings from the gold standard period when 
changes in contagion occurred as the monetary environment changed from mild 
deflation to mild inflation? 
XIV. Conclusion: Crisis Connections or Contagions? 
Our formal analysis above of the correlations among the market short-term 
interest rates before and after the three major crises of the gold standard period leads us 
to doubt that contagion was an important feature then, even under a regime of fixed 
exchange rates and open capital markets.  Rather, we conclude that different rules of 
the game were appropriate for different players.  Countries that had weak specie 
reserves and governments prone to budget deficits were well advised not to follow the 
example of the Bank of England during crisis episodes.  Rather than lend freely at a 
penalty rate when the international markets were roiled by a credit crunch somewhere 
in the world, they were better off maintaining their previous discount rates so they 
could lend judiciously with side conditions to only the most solvent of their customers.  
This surely inhibited risk-taking by the local banking establishment, and probably 
                                                                                                                                                                         
MA: July 1999. retarded economic growth, but it did preserve stability in the political sphere while 
coping with wrenching structural changes in their economies.  It also meant that 
financial crises, rather than increasing correlations among capital markets, actually 
tended to decrease them. 
Policy makers acting through the maintenance of discount rates established by 
their respective public banks, therefore, had different concerns, which varied from 
country to country.  Comparing the responses of the several countries that eventually 
formed the basis for the first global financial market to the systemic crises that struck 
from time to time, contagion appeared less likely (1890) when the short-term capital 
markets had been allowed to operate in an interdependent, well-integrated manner 
before the crisis.  Only when differences in interest rate patterns were attempted by 
countries before a crisis by whatever means – different monetary regime, informal 
capital controls, support of fiduciary issues – then an especially severe crisis made 
common responses more likely to a common shock (1893 and 1907). 
                                                                                                                                                                         
47 Michael D. Bordo and Antu Panini Murshid, “Are Financial Crises Becoming 
Increasingly Contagious?  What is the Historical Evidence on Contagion?” NBER 
Working Paper, 7900, Cambridge, MA, September 2000.  Table 1. Stock Market Crisis of 1825 
 
  Correlation Coefficients      
  Pre-crisis  Post-Crisis      
Index  0.794  0.521       
French rentes  0.848  -0.197   Precrisis  Postcrisis   
Colombia 6s  0.881  0.328   UK var  UK var   
Chile 6s  0.910  0.190   12.740 4.301  
           
   Adjusted  Contagion  Contagion  Contagion  
 Correlation  Coefficients       SE/PreCrisis  SE Postcrisis  test  
Index  0.914  0.724  0.166  0.282  -0.423 N 
French rentes  0.940  -0.327  0.139  0.386  -2.411 N 
Colombia 6s  0.955  0.513  0.122  0.350  -0.936 N 
Chile 6s  0.967  0.316  0.105  0.387  -1.323 N Table 2. Interest Rate Volatility during the Classical Gold Standard Period, 
 1880-1914 
 
Country    Standard Deviation    Standard Deviation  
      (Long Term Bonds    (Short Term Market Bills) 
 
Austria     .375     .712 
 
France     .299     .682 
 
Germany    .169     1.11 
 
Netherlands    .317     .917 
 




 Table 3.  "Contagious" Crises during the Classical Gold Standard Period 
 
 
Panic of 1873 
 
Pre-Crisis: September 21, 1872 - September 13, 1873 
 
Post-Crisis: September 20, 1873 - September 12, 1874 
 
 
Baring Crisis of 1890 
 
Pre-Crisis: October 5,1889 - September 27, 1890 
 
Post-Crisis: October 4, 1890 - September 26, 1891 
 
 
US Banking Crisis of 1893 
 
Pre-Crisis:  October 8, 1892 - October 7, 1893 
 
Post-Crisis: October 13, 1893 - September 29,1894 
 
 
Panic of 1907 
 
Pre-Crisis: October 22, 1906 - October 19, 1907 
 




 Table 4. Crisis of 1873, Short-term capital markets. 
 
  Correlation Coefficients      
  Pre-crisis  Post-Crisis      
France  0.665 0.429          
Germany  0.144 0.281          
Netherlands  -0.099 0.284          
Belgium  -0.016 0.476    Precrisis  Postcrisis    
Austria  0.187 0.680    US var  US var    
Russia  0.259 -0.235   0.209  0.824     
UK  0.098 0.163          
              
  Adjusted     Contagion   Contagion   Contagion  
  Precrisis  Postcrisis    SE/PreCrisis  SE Postcrisis  test   
France  0.409 0.232    0.135  0.143  -0.635  NC 
Germany  0.073 0.146    0.147  0.146  0.248  NC 
Netherlands  -0.050 0.147    0.147  0.146  0.674  NC 
Belgium  -0.008 0.263    0.147  0.142  0.935  NC 
Austria  0.095 0.423    0.147  0.134  1.168  NC 
Russia  0.134 -0.121    0.146  0.146  -0.870  NC 
United Kingdom  0.409 0.232    0.135  0.143  -0.635  NC Table 5. Crisis of 1890, Short-term capital markets. 
 
   Correlation  Coefficients     
 Pre-crisis  Post-Crisis       
France  0.211 0.546          
Germany  0.442 0.698          
Netherlands  -0.164 0.280          
Belgium  0.646 0.769          
Italy  0.366 0.688          
Austria  0.578 0.608          
Portugal  0.647 0.462          
Russia  0.052 0.711          
United States  0.336 0.837          
Denmark  0.047 0.275     Precrisis  Postcrisis   
Australia  -0.162 -0.489      UK var  UK var   
India  -0.302 0.095     0.547 1.513   
              
  Adjusted     Contagion   Contagion   Contagion  
  Precrisis  Postcrisis    SE/PreCrisis  SE Postcrisis  test   
France  0.129 0.365    0.146 0.137  0.833  NC 
Germany  0.284 0.506    0.141 0.127  0.825  NC 
Netherlands  -0.099 0.173    0.147 0.145  0.932  NC 
Belgium  0.454 0.586    0.131 0.119  0.528  NC 
Italy  0.230 0.495    0.143 0.128  0.976  NC 
Austria  0.392 0.418    0.136 0.134  0.098  NC 
Portugal  0.454 0.299    0.131 0.141  -0.572  NC 
Russia  0.031 0.519    0.147 0.126  1.786  C 
United States  0.210 0.677    0.144 0.109  1.849  C 
Denmark  0.028 0.169    0.147 0.145  0.482  NC 
Australia  -0.098 -0.319    0.147 0.140  -0.772  NC 
India  -0.187 0.057    0.145 0.147  0.837  NC 
 Table 6. Crisis of 1893, Short-term capital markets. 
 
   Correlation  Coefficients    
 Pre-crisis  Post-Crisis       
France  0.475 -0.339        
Germany  0.234 0.234        
Netherlands  -0.144 0.895        
Belgium  0.098 0.706        
Italy  0.549 -0.656        
Austria  0.438 -0.792        
Portugal  0.228 0.150        
Russia  -0.077 -0.717        
Switzerland  0.045 0.573        
Australia  -0.084 0.097   Precrisis  Postcrisis   
India  -0.187 -0.715    US var  US var   
UK  -0.170 -0.523    0.442 0.255   
              
            
  Adjusted   Contagion   Contagion   Contagion  
 Precrisis  Postcrisis  SE/Precrisis  SE  Postcrisis  test   
France  0.579 -0.429  0.120  0.133  -3.977  NC 
Germany  0.302 0.303  0.141  0.141  0.002  NC 
Netherlands  -0.188 0.935  0.145  0.052  5.702  C 
Belgium  0.129 0.795  0.146  0.089  2.831  C 
Italy  0.654 -0.753  0.112  0.097  -6.747  NC 
Austria  0.540 -0.863  0.124  0.075  -7.063  NC 
Portugal  0.295 0.196  0.141  0.145  -0.346  NC 
Russia  -0.101 -0.804  0.147  0.088  -3.002  NC 
Switzerland  0.059 0.677  0.166  0.123  2.138  C 
Australia  -0.110 0.127  0.147  0.146  0.811  NC 
India  -0.243 -0.803  0.143  0.088  -2.424  NC 
UK  -0.221 -0.628  0.144  0.115  -1.574  NC 
            
 Table 7. Crisis of 1907, Short-term Capital Markets, seasonal adjusted data. 
 
   Correlation  Coefficients     
 Pre-crisis  Post-Crisis       
France  -0.708 0.915       
Germany  0.750 0.956       
Netherlands  0.065 0.955       
Belgium  -0.229 0.963       
Italy  0.511 0.941       
Austria  -0.144 0.921       
Switzerland  0.615 0.961       
United States  0.788 0.952       
India  0.393 0.173          
Sweden  0.602 0.791   Precrisis  Postcrisis   
Denmark  0.746 0.744    UK var  UK var   
Spain  0.460 0.595    0.723 3.158   
            
            
  Adjusted   Contagion   Contagion   Contagion   
 Precrisis  Postcrisis  SE/Precrisis  SE  Postcrisis  test   
France  -0.432 0.735  0.133  0.100  5.014  C 
Germany  0.477 0.842  0.130  0.080  1.744  C 
Netherlands  0.031 0.839  0.147  0.080  3.547  C 
Belgium  -0.112 0.863  0.147  0.074  4.412  C 
Italy  0.274 0.799  0.142  0.089  2.282  C 
Austria  -0.069 0.749  0.147  0.098  3.345  C 
Switzerland  0.350 0.857  0.138  0.076  2.369  C 
United States  0.522 0.830  0.126  0.082  1.480  NC 
India  0.200 0.084  0.144  0.147  -0.400  NC 
Sweden  0.339 0.526  0.139  0.125  0.707  NC 
Denmark  0.472 0.470  0.130  0.130  -0.009  NC 
Spain  0.241 0.334  0.143  0.139  0.331  NC 
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 Data Appendix 
 
Data  Type   Country Description   Data  Availability 
 
Bank Discount Rates  Austria          Jan. 1, 1870 - June 27, 1914 
 
  Belgium         Jan. 1, 1870 - June 27, 1914 
 
   Denmark    May  10,  1884  -  June  27,  1914
    
   France      Jan.  1,  1870  -  June  27,  1914 
 
      Germany  Berlin bank    Jan. 1, 1870 - June 27, 1914 
     r a t e  
 
      Italy    Genoa bank    Jan. 24, 1885 - June 27, 1914
      r a t e  
 
   Netherlands     Jan.  1,  1870  -  June  27,  1914 
 
   Norway      Jan.  6,  1894  -  June  27,  1914 
 
   Portugal      Jan.  24,  1885  -  June  27,  1914 
 
      Russia    St. Petersburg    Jan. 1, 1870 - June 27, 1914
    
   Spain      Jan.  6,  1885  -  June  27,  1914
     
   Sweden      Dec.  17,  1892  -  June  27,  1914 
 
   Switzerland     Dec.  17,  1892  -  June  27,  1892 
 
      United Kingdom        Jan. 1, 1870 - June 27, 1914 
     
 
Open Market Rates  Austria          Jan. 1, 1870 - June 27, 1914 
 (3 month bills)   
   Australia  discount rate for    May 10, 1884 - Dec. 30, 1893 
     A u s t r a l i a n   b a n k s  
     operating  in  London   
 
  Belgium         Jan. 1, 1870 - June 27, 1914 
 
   Denmark    May  10,  1884  -  June  27,  1914
    
   France      Jan.  1,  1870  -  June  27,  1914 
 
      Germany  Berlin open    Jan. 1, 1870 - June 27, 1914 
     m a r k e t   r a t e  
 
      India    Bombay bank rate  May 10, 1884 - June 27, 1914
      
      Italy    Genoa open    Jan. 24, 1885 - June 27, 1914
      m a r k e t   r a t e  
 
   Netherlands     Jan.  1,  1870  -  June  27,  1914    Norway      Jan.  6,  1894  -  June  27,  1914 
 
   Portugal      Jan.  24,  1885  -  June  27,  1914 
 
      Russia    St. Petersburg    Feb. 4, 1871 - June 27, 1914
      o p e n   m a r k e t   r a t e  
 
   Spain      Jan.  6,  1885  -  June  27,  1914
     
   Sweden      Dec.  17,  1892  -  June  27,  1914 
 
   Switzerland     Dec.  17,  1892  -  June  27,  1892 
 
      United Kingdom        Jan. 1, 1870 - June 27, 1914 
    
  United States  call money rate in   Nov. 27, 1880 - June 27, 1914  
   New  York  City 
  
 
Long-Term Bond Rates   Austria   5% Silver Rentes   Jan. 2, 1880 - Dec. 29, 1899 
 
          4% Gold Rentes    Jan 2. 1880 - Dec. 1913 
 
Belgium   3% Rentes    Jan. 16, 1885 - Oct. 21, 1898 
            
      France    3% Rentes    Jan. 2 1880 - July 31, 1914 
 
   Germany  Prussian Consols   Dec. 31, 1880 - Dec. 31, 1909 
     ( 4 %   c o n v e r t e d   t o   3 . 5 %  
     April  22,  1898) 
 
          3% Imperial    Aug. 24, 1894 - Dec. 26, 1913 
    
     4%  Imperial   November  23,  1894  -  Dec. 
26,1913 
 
   Italy   4%    Jan.  2,  1880  -  Dec.  26,  1913 
  
   Netherlands  3%      Aug. 25, 1882 - Dec. 26, 1913 
 
   Russia   5%    Jan.  2.  1880  -  July  31,  1914 
 
      United Kingdom  3%/2.75% Consols  Jan. 2, 1880 - July 31, 1914 
 
      United States  4%      Jan. 2, 1880 - Aug. 9, 1907 
 








     
  
 
"Contagious" Crises during the Classical Gold Standard Period 
 
 
Panic of 1873 
 
Pre-Crisis: September 13, 1872 - September 13, 1873    (n=52) 
 
Post-Crisis: September 20, 1873 - September 20, 1874  (n=52) 
 
 
Baring Crisis of 1890 
 
Pre-Crisis: September 27,1889 - September 27, 1890  (n=52) 
 
Post-Crisis: October 4, 1890 - October 4, 1891  (n=52) 
 
 
US Banking Crisis of 1893 
 
Pre-Crisis:  September 30, 1892 - September 30, 1893  (n=52) 
 
Post-Crisis: October 7, 1893 - October 7, 1894  (n=52) 
 
 
Panic of 1907 
 
Pre-Crisis: October 19, 1906 - October 19, 1907    (n=52) 
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Coefficients of Variation - Periphery
Crisis of 1907
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